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Abstract 
Network industries, such as electricity, railways and air transport, are very complex technical, 
economic, and political systems in which the interplay of technology and institutions has a 
significant impact on performance. While the performance of the network industries has always 
been relevant in one way or another (e.g., affordability and reliability of the service), the 
definition of performance has changed with the process of liberalization and has become more 
and more focused on economic efficiency. This paper argues that the targeted performance 
objectives (e.g., technical, operational, social, economic and/or environmental) have to be 
defined beforehand; only then can technology and institutions be aligned so that a certain 
coherence between them leads to the targeted performance (based on the "coherence 
framework"). This paper aims to further define performance in the network industries as well as 
to further substantiate the coherence framework between institutions and technologies. The 
methodology is based on case studies in different network industries.  
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Introduction 
Network industries such as electricity, railway, air transport, potable water and telecom provide 
essential services. They are very complex technical, economic and political systems, and have 
high asset specificity and few substitutes. Technical or institutional failures within the network 
have significant and large scale systemic consequences. Network industries exhibit 
interdependencies (Laperrouza, 2009) and support other technologies and the pace at which they 
are built determines the pace at which other technologies can be diffused (Saviotti, 2005: 17). 
The performance of network industries matters, mainly from a macroeconomic perspective, i.e. 
public welfare, which includes several dimensions such as economic (e.g. consumer welfare), 
social (e.g. social welfare), technical (e.g. accidents), operational (e.g. delays) and environmental 
(e.g. CO2-emissions). 
The network industries have undergone over the past 20 years significant reforms, i.e., de-and re-
regulation within the liberalization process. These were mainly institutional changes. The aims of 
reforms differed between network industries. In certain cases, the objective was to increase 
consumer welfare by the introduction of competition. In other cases, like in railways, the aim 
was to reduce the losses incurred by the incumbent state-owned operator. 
With the liberalization the considerations about performance have changed. Performance does 
not matter solely from a macroeconomic perspective, but with the appearance of multiple actors 
performance is a concern at the firm-level as well. Over the past two decades social and technical 
performance (e.g. accessibility and availability) have been trumped by economic performance. 
Finger, Groenwegen and Künneke (2005) have postulated that the performance of the network 
industries is related to the degree of coherence between institutions and technology. Their claim 
stemmed from the observation that liberalization (as an institutional change) has introduced a 
certain incoherence between the new liberalized institutions on the one hand and the current state 
of the technology on the other hand. Therefore, performance – they claim – will be affected by 
liberalization. This has to be looked at from a sector-specific perspective, as in some sectors 
liberalization may well improve performance as a result of a better adequacy between 
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technologies (which have evolved prior to liberalization, e.g., telecom) and the new institutions. 
In other sectors, however, performance will suffer, as the newly liberalized institutions are no 
longer in line with the technology (e.g., railways). Furthermore, the authors state that 
performance is not a unified concept, so that the coherence between technology and institutions 
affects differently the different types of performance (technical, operational, social, economic 
and environmental). 
While this offers a convincing conceptual framework from which to analyze the performance of 
the liberalizing network industries, their theory remains weak on several accounts: first, 
performance in the network industries is not yet well defined and more conceptual work is 
needed here. Second, the concept of coherence (between technology and institutions) remains 
fuzzy: here also substantial work is needed to better conceptualize the concept of coherence. 
Finally, the links between such coherence and performance is not yet well established, which 
constitutes a third conceptual challenge. 
The goal of this paper is to make a contribution to the conceptual framework of coherence 
between institutions and technologies in the network industries. In order to do that, we will 
proceed as follows: 
- In a first section, we present and critically analyze the coherence framework. We mostly 
focus on the contributions by Finger, Groenewegen and Künneke (Finger, Groenewegen 
et al., 2005; Groenewegen, 2005; Künneke and Finger, 2007; Künneke, 2008; Künneke, 
Groenewegen et al., 2008), but also refer to other authors who have contributed to such 
theory building. In doing so, we identify and qualify the three main weaknesses of that 
framework. 
- In a second section, we review the literature on performance in network industries 
showing that there is no clear definition of performance yet, and more importantly that 
the definition of performance depends on the level of analysis. 
- In the third section, we present three cases – namely the liberalization in the electricity, 
the railways, and the air transport – from the perspective of the infrastructure manager 
using the broad conceptual framework. In particular, we highlight how performance is 
4 
being looked at in these sectors. In section four, we analyze these cases so as to improve 
upon the existing conceptual framework. This section therefore contains the main results 
of our paper, namely in the form of an improved conceptual framework, focusing in 
particular on the first weaknesses identified in the framework (i.e., performance 
definition) and in the outline of future research requirements and perspectives. 
- Finally, section five gives concluding remarks. 
1. The coherence framework 
Within the coherence framework, performance is a function of the coherence between 
institutions and technologies. The framework is based on the literature on the co-evolution 
between institutions and technology in network industries (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005; 
Groenewegen, 2005; Hodgson, 2006; Künneke, Groenewegen et al., 2008; Kunneke, 2008; 
Ménard, 2009). We start by reviewing a number of concepts used in the framework and in the 
literature. We begin with the broader concept, before narrowing down to coherence and 
performance. 
North defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way 
societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.” (North, 
1990: 3) Institutions therefore can be formal or informal, and are for example institutional 
arrangements (e.g., contracts, alliances), the formal institutional environment of socio-technical 
systems (e.g., laws and regulations) and the institutional environment (e.g., values, norms, 
traditions, and customs). 
Saviotti (2005: 12) defines technology as “the set of activities by means of which human beings 
modify their external environment.” These “activities” mostly refer to technical artifacts and do 
not include ideas. Within the case studies of this paper, the electricity, railways and air transport 
sectors represent the technologies.  
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Co-evolution is the reciprocal interactions between two populations, entities or systems. These 
interactions have a significant causal impact on each other and need to be strong and in localized 
proximity (Kallis, 2007). The literature of co-evolution between institutions and technologies 
describes the general process of changes within them and highlights the necessity to align these 
changes (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005; Künneke, Groenewegen et al., 2008; Kunneke, 
2008). It does not provide a framework to measure and compare institutions and technologies nor 
to measure the impact of the changes. Neither does it explain how governments could facilitate 
such an alignment. The framework of coherence between institutions and technologies tries to 
overcome this problem in the case of network industries.  
This coherence framework aims to link the degree of coherence between institutions and 
technologies and the performance of the network industry infrastructure. As developed by 
Künneke, Finger, Groenewegen and Menard, it contains a way to compare and match institutions 
to technologies (Finger, Groenewegen et al., 2005; Groenewegen, 2005; Künneke and Finger, 
2007; Künneke, Groenewegen et al., 2008; Kunneke, 2008; Ménard, 2009). The framework is 
conditioned by the fact that it applies to network industries and not the individual products so 
often described in theories of co-evolution. 
The critical technical functions are central to the functioning of network industries which are 
complex infrastructures. If these three functions are not properly assumed, then the functioning 
of the infrastructure system is diminished. These functions are always assumed by way of a 
combination between technology and institutions and can be described as follows: First, there is 
the function of interconnection, which deals with the physical linkage of different networks that 
perform similar of complementary tasks. Interconnecting networks is the prerequisite for 
operating them as a system or running a common market on them. Second, interoperability 
ensures that mutual interactions between network elements can take place. In an electricity 
network, this is achieved either by synchronizing the network elements to the same alternating 
current (AC) frequency (in Europe, 50 Hz), or by linking them through a direct current (DC) 
interconnector (first network function) and transform the electricity at both end of the 
interconnector. In the railway network, different historical track gauges are either harmonized or 
rolling-stock is fitted with flexible gauge axles. Third, system management pertains to the 
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question of how the overall system is being managed, including capacity management dealing 
with the allocation of scare network capacity.  
The critical technical functions exist because there are network constraints which they try to 
remedy. Duthaler and Finger (2010) define five constraints. The interconnection constraint is the 
ability to physically interconnect parts of the network. The interoperability constraint is the 
ability to interoperate between parts of the network. This may be limited, even if a physical 
interconnection is established. System management is affected by three constraints. The capacity 
constraint is given by the fact that any (physical) network has a limited transmission capacity. 
The controllability constraint deals with the limitation of the amount and direction of flows on a 
network and due to physical properties or other restrictions. The storability constraint is the 
ability of a network to store what it carries, which may be very limited such as in the case of 
electricity. 
The degree of coherence between institutions and technologies was defined by the coherence in 
scope of control (i.e., geographical space), the coherence between coordination mechanisms 
(decentralized, centralized, peer-to-peer), the coherence in resolution (i.e., how detailed the 
geographical view is) and coherence between speed of adjustment (e.g., operational balancing, 
duration of contracts and lifetime of infrastructure). Using these four perspectives, the degree of 
coherence can be evaluated for each critical technical function and increases the better the 
institutions and technology are aligned. In Duthaler and Finger (2010) it is shown that the degree 
to which coherence is able to explain the performance of network industries depends on the 
sector-specific and time-dependent importance of network constraints. In other words, the 
contribution of coherence in explaining performance is sector-specific and time-dependent. 
Apart from coherence, other technological and institutional factors contribute to explaining 
performance.  
More research is clearly required on this coherence aspect as it remains fuzzy. Especially the 
evaluation of the degree of coherence needs to be better elaborated. The relationships between 
the coherence and the network constraints and critical technical functions need to be better 
defined as well. 
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Performance in this framework is defined by way of three parameters: the economic 
performance, the public value and the integrity of the technical system (Finger, Groenewegen et 
al., 2005, Ch. 2.3). The economic performance concerns the static, dynamic and system 
efficiency. The public value is defined by the quality, accessibility, affordability and reliability of 
the service, as well as the environmental aspects. Performance criteria of the technical system 
integrity include resilience and robustness.  
Figure 1 schematizes the framework and is an adaptation of the original figure of Finger, 
Groenewegen et al. (2005). Newly introduced was the dynamics observed in most network 
industries of institutions moving from government (nationally centralized institutions) to 
different modes of governance (e.g., local, supra-national). The technologies moved from 
centralized and vertically-integrated to more decentralized und unbundled technologies.  
 
 
Figure 1: The framework of coherence between institutions and technologies  
 
Source: Authors 
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The literature on the coherence framework highlights the need of alignment between institutions 
and technologies when institutional and/or technical changes are made to the infrastructure. 
Before recent development, it did not provide a roadmap of implementation.  
In a recent paper (Finger, Laperrouza et al., 2010), the dynamics of the network industries are 
analyzed based on the coherence framework. Dynamics are introduced by the role of the actors 
influencing the institutions (i.e. rules of the game), the innovation and development of 
technologies and the definition of performance. The dynamics are also conditioned by different 
sets of configuration in which a network industry can operate (e.g. public monopoly, competition 
over network, competition of networks). That paper concludes on governing these dynamics 
within network industries. In summary, the technology needs to be supported by suitable 
institutions in order to reach the targeted performance. The coherence framework conceptualizes 
this finding, but remains very qualitative and general. 
1.1 The weaknesses of the coherence framework 
The first two weaknesses are related to the definitions of performance and coherence. As 
performance is the target to reach and institutions and technologies have to be aligned 
accordingly, it’s the first weakness of the framework to deal with. It’s the focus of this paper. 
The coherence definition which allows evaluating the degree of coherence between institutions 
and technologies has to be further developed as described above. A possible avenue could be to 
introduce measurable indicators for the technologies and institutions for each of the four 
described types of coherence, and thus allowing a quantitative comparison of institutions and 
technologies.  
Furthermore, the causality between coherence and performance has to be better developed and 
defined once the latter two are clearly defined. The research will show if more coherence always 
increases the performance or not, and if incoherence is required to trigger technological and/or 
institutional innovation. 
Another issue to further investigate within the framework is the definition of the unit of analysis. 
The unit of analysis is currently defined by the technical system boundaries. Using the critical 
technical functions, the boundaries are determined for each function (e.g., in electricity the 
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physical interconnection with synchronized AC (interoperability) and same voltage level for the 
system management). Interconnection and interoperability are key to define the system 
boundaries, more from an infrastructure perspective (“hardware”). System management is key 
from a management perspective (“software”).  
When all these weaknesses are dealt with, the matching of institutions and technologies to 
increase the coherence and therefore the performance within a network industry will become 
more concrete. Recommendations on how decision-makers can facilitate the alignment between 
institutions and technologies will become available based on the framework. 
2. Performance in network industries 
The original framework looked at institutions and technologies first, followed by conclusions on 
the coherence and performance. In this paper, we take the opposite approach by first looking at 
performance, followed by aligning institutions and technologies in a coherent way. Once the 
infrastructure is in place and operated, the performance should be measurable and therefore 
comparable with the initially targeted performance.  
There is no consensus on performance of network industries (Karlsson, 2007: 2). This is partly 
due to unresolved problems in how to define and measure performance of network industries. 
According to Karlsson et al. (2007: 2) “an analysis of sector efficiency that considers the 
hierarchical characteristic of many systems, specifically the efficiency effects that a subsystem 
imposes overall, has not been adequately addressed.” Each network industry has its specific 
technical features which need to be taken into account, but there are similarities across the 
network industries as well. The literature review tries to give an overview of the current 
performance definition and of some indicators. 
2.1 Literature review on performance in network industries 
In a broader sense, performance can be defined as the “accomplishment of a given task measured 
against preset standards of accuracy, completeness, cost, and speed.”1 
                                                 
1
 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/performance.html (Nov 2009) 
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A substantial body of literature on performance management has developed since the late 1970s. 
The first attempts at performance evaluation and review were associated with the failed attempts 
at large scale strategic planning in the 1970s (Boland and Fowler, 2000)2. 
Performance measures can be used for monitoring trends in performances or for comparative 
analysis of companies' performances on key performance indicators (KPIs). The measures can be 
used to evaluate the companies' performances and to learn about and improve corporate policies 
and optimize management processes. Through effective communication, performance measures 
can also be used as a marketing tool to enhance corporate reputation (Gelders, Galetzka et al., 
2008). 
Cole and Cooper (2005) argue that performance indicators (PIs) are fraught with problems. For 
instance, taking the case of railways they criticize the narrow scope of performance indicators 
(strongly centered on punctuality and reliability whilst focusing only slightly on one aspect of 
safety3). They argue that the use of PIs reflects a wider political agenda (the maintenance and 
support of capitalism). For them, the use of railway PIs is an example of “how there is an 
increasing tendency on the part of government to quantify what cannot be quantified or ‘make 
the invisible visible’” (Cole and Cooper, 2005: 199). In the UK, the performance indicators used 
by government to render the railways accountable are narrow. In addition as pointed out by (Cole 
and Cooper, 2005), the question remains as to whether the information that these indicators 
transmit to the public gives a realistic impression of the quality of service provided to rail users.  
In their broad literature review of performance measurements Micheli and Kennerley (2005) 
point to the differences between private and public sector (for instance in the public sector PIs 
are always subject to political and social choices). Policy makers and managers of rail 
organizations have different interests and require different information. Managers are typically 
interested in performance at an operational level, seeking to improve the technical efficiency of 
their operation(s). Policy makers are primarily interested in performance at an aggregate level, 
seeking to improve the performance of the industry as a whole (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
                                                 
2
 Boland and Fowler also point to the difference between public and private sector performance. The former has to 
account to several stakeholders while the latter has to respond solely, at least in theory, to its shareholders. 
3
 For instance track maintenance or crime levels. 
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Di Francesco (1999) identifies various problems relating to performance measurement in the 
public sector (output specification, quality and effectiveness measurement, client identification) 
and suggests some possible ways of coping with them. Four main performance measurement 
criteria are identified: validity, reliability, functionality and legitimacy.  
The question of measuring the performance of firms active in network industries goes beyond the 
traditional notion of firm performance. Indeed, many of these firms are part of a wider 
environment than most firms. The interconnectedness of network industries implies that their 
performance not only very often cascades on other sectors. At the same time, their performance 
also often depends directly on actors within and outside the sector. The high-level of 
interconnectedness means that the definition and, more importantly, the measurement of 
performance in network industries poses a number of problems such as being able to determine 
where the locus of responsibility lies. In the case of railways, the lack of infrastructure 
maintenance can, for instance, reduce the speed at which a passenger or freight train can 
circulate over the tracks.  
The existing literature is primarily about economic/social performance and secondarily about 
technical/operational performance. Several authors develop different approaches to performance 
and establish performance indicators, which need to be further developed (Lawrence, Houghton 
et al., 1997; Commission for the European Communities, 2004; Estache and Goicoechea, 2005; 
Jamasb, Mota et al., 2005; Martin, Roma et al., 2005). Several authors deal with regulatory 
performance, governance and performance, and ownership and performance (Boardman and 
Vining, 1989; Stern and Holder, 1999; Knieps, 2004; Spiller and Tommasi, 2005; Andres, 
Guasch et al., 2008; Gasmi, Noumba Um et al., 2009). These papers look at the regulation, 
industry structure, governance, ownership and then analyze the performance. This paper takes 
the issue the other way round - first set the performance objective, then put in place the 
technology and institutions (e.g. regulation, governance, technological choices), and gives a 
more important focus on technologies 
As intermediary conclusion it can be said that there are an infinite number of ways to look at 
performance and that there is no accepted definition. Based on earlier work on the coherence 
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framework, five performance categories will be further developed in this paper using the case 
studies. They are introduced in the next section and the results are in Section 4. 
2.2 Performance categories 
The focus of many studies on a single category of performance fails to achieve comparative 
evaluation along several dimensions (Ménard and Ghertman, 2009: 170). Because the above 
mentioned institutional changes involve economic, social and environmental dimension, and 
because it is possible that there are trade-offs between these different dimension, studies need to 
use multiple categories.  
Based on Finger et al. (2005), five performance categories are defined as represented in the 
following figure. The initial economic and technical performances are kept, the public value is 
divided in social and environmental performance, and the operational dimension is added. The 
categories have to be so large that they can be declined in every sector. Ultimately, the choice 
and weight of each category is a choice done by the stakeholders, in particular by the political 
actors. 
Figure 2: Performance categories 
 
Source: Authors 
Economic 
Social 
Operational Technical 
Environmental 
Performance 
objectives 
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Examples of indicators per category are:  
- Economic: price evolution in the sector, subsidies (e.g. subsidies per pass-km in 
railways), and production costs (e.g. costs per kWh in electricity) 
- Social: consumer satisfaction, accessibility, affordability, quality of service 
- Operational: reliability, use of the network (e.g. average load factor in railways), 
congestion 
- Technical: availability, losses (e.g. kWh per km in electricity), delivered service per 
capita (e.g. kWh per capita in electricity) 
- Environmental: GHG emissions per kWh in electricity and pass-km in railways 
In this paper, performance indicators are allocated to the three critical technical functions (one 
indicator can be linked to several functions) within the five performance categories. This shall 
contribute to further refine the performance definition within the coherence framework and in a 
broader sense for network industries in general. 
Finally, the way performance is defined also depends if one has a sector perspective or a more 
narrow perspective such as the one of the infrastructure manager. The unit/level of analysis has 
significant implications particularly in network industries where downstream activities are, by 
definition, dependent on upstream activities. 
3. Case studies 
The infrastructure manager perspective was chosen because of the similarities across the studied 
sectors which allow a common analysis. For one, the infrastructure manager shares the 
characteristics of natural monopoly. It ensures that only one firm provides the service. But 
additional research especially on the operators using the infrastructure (e.g. rolling stock 
operator) will be required to further refine the performance definition and its measurement in 
network industries, and the interaction between infrastructure managers and operators. 
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3.1 Railways 
In the crudest way, a railway company can be considered as an aggregate production unit that 
operates in a given network and transforms labor, capital and energy inputs into units of transport 
services such as passenger-kilometers of public transport and ton-kilometers of freight (Farsi, 
Filippini et al., 2005: 72). For a large part of the 20th century the production of railway transport 
services tended to be integrated in a single entity4. The production of these services can 
nonetheless be divided into 3 elements: 
- Infrastructure managers: the entity in charge of the physical railway network; in the vast 
majority, IMs are also in charge of the signalling systems and of the interface infrastructure 
(i.e. train stations). Given the economies of scale, IMs are usually granted monopolies. 
- Railway undertakings: they are usually divided into firms transporting passengers and goods. 
In a number of countries, a single firm used to provide both services. With liberalization, 
competition has been introduced in both services. For instance, in Europe freight is open to 
competition. In passenger transport, competition on-the-tracks remains limited at the national 
level while competition-for-the-tracks is more prevalent at the regional and local levels. 
- Slot/capacity allocators: the necessity of a slot/capacity allocator has emerged with the 
liberalization process. Its role is by-and-large is to ensure fair access to the network. Non-
discriminatory access is particularly important since the unbundling of infrastructure from 
operations is in many cases still at the beginning creating an important asymmetry in the 
market. 
Liberalization of railways and in particular of infrastructure 
In most countries the infrastructure per se has not been liberalized. The liberalization effort has 
rather been focused on unbundling infrastructure management from train operations. There are a 
few countries in Europe where railway infrastructure is not fully in the hands of a single entity. 
                                                 
4
 In many countries the initial development of railways consisted in separated networks which at one point were 
grouped together (usually by nationalization) to form the integrated railway networks we are familiar with today. In 
fact, “as early as the mid-1830s it was generally agreed that the management of tracks and trains should be 
integrated. This did not rule out the subcontracting of train operations to independent companies, provided that these 
companies followed appropriate regulations, and worked to a centrally determined timetable, as on the railway 
system of today” (Casson, 2009: 251). 
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For instance, in Germany some minor players (dubbed NE-Bahnen) still own their old 
infrastructure and have often expanded their operations onto the network of Deutsche Bahn 
(Lalive and Schmutzler, 2008: 447). In Switzerland, Berne-Lötschberg-Simplon (BLS) operates 
more than 520KM of tracks (of which it owns 436KM)5. Management of infrastructure is limited 
to the network it “owns” in full6. In exchange for BLS operating the S-Bahn (suburban railway 
services) in Bern, CFF runs all the long-distance trains on the BLS network7. As to train 
operations, the system can be divided in two sectors: 1) international and inter-regional 
transports (operated by CFF) and 2) regional and local transport services operated by close to 50 
regional railway companies. The latter operate under a regional monopoly license with the 
obligation to provide regular services at given tariffs (Farsi, Filippini et al., 2005).  
Performance in railway infrastructure 
Infrastructure performance systems are almost as diverse as the ways of organizing railway 
systems. That said some common railway performance indicators are found across Europe, e.g. 
the percentage of planned train-kilometers delivered per month, the percentage of services no 
more than 5 minutes late, the passenger-minutes late, the percentage of  train cancellations, the 
train-minutes late (Hastings, 2010: 319-320). 
In Switzerland a performance agreement negotiated between CFF and the Swiss Confederation 
defines the requirements and is updated every four years. At the same time the compensation 
rates per train and track kilometer are defined. A number of performance-related measures are 
expressed in the document that settles the mandate between the Confederation and CFF8. The 
mandate is worded in broad strategic orientations. Each business unit (e.g., infrastructure 
management, freight and passenger transport) is set goals related to transport policy, 
performance and finance. These are supplemented by social and environmental targets to be 
fulfilled by the company as a whole. 
                                                 
5
 A convention between CFF and BLS calls for increased cooperation between the two companies – the former 
should acquire 34% of BLS AG’s capital. BLS AG is owned by Canton of Berne (55.75%), Swiss Confederation 
(21.7%), legal entities and private individuals (14.4 %) and other cantons, municipalities (8.15 %). 
6
 Since January 2009, the Swiss Confederation is the majority shareholder of BLS Infrastructure (50.05%), followed 
by BLS AG (33.4%), Canton of Berne (16.5%) and CFF (0.05%). 
7
 This includes the following lines: Brig-Basel, Interlaken-Basel, Interlaken-Zurich. 
8
 Convention sur les prestations entre la Confédération suisse et la société anonyme Chemins de fer fédéraux (CFF), 
applicable aux années 2007 à 2010 (Feuille Fédérale, 2006). 
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In the case of passenger traffic, CFF is expected to absorb a majority of the traffic growth in the 
“grandes lignes” segment, to reach the agreed upon level of punctuality and to guarantee 
connections. At the same time, CFF is asked to increase its productivity in different domains 
(infrastructure, passenger traffic) by 3% every year. Some of the objectives are also financial: 
balanced cash flow over a five-year period, positive results in certain segments (e.g. “grandes 
lignes” and freight), neutral in others (e.g. infrastructure). Little is actually mentioned regarding 
the environment. The mandate asks that, “within the possibilities offered by the management of 
the firm, the strategy must follow ethical and sustainable principles”9. The infrastructure is not 
considered as an end in itself but must adjust optimally to the traffic on its network. The 
Confederation sets a number of strategic objectives: guarantee a high level of security, ensure 
network capacity10 (optimal dimensioning and availability of the network), optimal usage of 
available capacities, improvement of interoperability, reduction of exploitation and maintenance 
costs (see table 2). The objectives given to the infrastructure manager vary little over time 
although emphasis seems to shift from time to time. For instance, one can expect that once it has 
been achieved interoperability will become a secondary goal while the environmental aspect 
(both noise and CO2 emission reductions) may become increasingly important in the future. 
Table 1: Objectives for rail infrastructure 2011-2012 
Objectives Details 
Security Reduce probability of occurrence and potential of high known risks 
Network 
management 
Optimal dimension and high availability of network 
Capacity allocation Guarantee independent attribution of capacity 
Interoperability Migration towards ETCS and GSM-R11 
Productivity Incentives for higher efficiency and purchasing synergies 
Source: Authors, adapted from (Swiss Confederation, 2010) 
The performance agreement between the Confederation and CFF serves as a management 
instrument in the traffic and infrastructure sectors, in which the strategic directives, objectives 
and offer of services to be followed, achieved and provided are set down for four years. The 
performance agreement includes an appropriation for payment, an instrument to govern 
                                                 
9
 Objectifs stratégiques assignés aux CFF par le Conseil fédéral de 2007 à 2010. 
10
 Network capacity includes a stable schedule and maintaining delays in spite of an increase of the utilization rate. 
11
 European Train Control System (ETCS) and GSM-R (a mobile telecommunication standard adapted for the 
railway sector) are two components of the new European railway signaling system. 
17 
expenditure in which the funds available for achievement of the required performance are 
stipulated. 
The infrastructure manager has also defined a number of strategic objectives “for himself” (see 
table 3). In 2004 these were to “achieve operational excellence in the areas of punctuality, safety, 
availability and productivity even as financial resources become increasingly scarce”12. In 2008, 
the strategic objective for infrastructure became more precise: 
- to maintain an efficient and cost-effective network 
- to promote interoperability as well as the technical development and innovation of the 
standard gauge network 
- to make more efficient use of the subsidies received, thus facilitating a reduction in such 
subsidies or a lowering of train-path charges 
- to seek the support of train-path users for train-path planning; to operate a non-
discriminatory train-path allocation system. As both co-owner and customer of Trassen 
Schweiz AG (Swiss Train Paths Ltd), to make optimum use of the capacities available 
- to achieve a reasonable annual increase in productivity 
 
Table 2: Strategic performance objectives and measures from infrastructure manager (internal) 
Security Collisions, derailments, # dangerous crossings, personal accidents 
Performance Network availability, infrastructure delays, delays safety equipment 
Network use Route-kilometer sales, route revenues 
Productivity Operations, maintenance, renewal 
Source: Personal communication 
Performance in Europe 
In Europe the notion of performance is explicitly dealt with by Article 11 of Directive 
2001/14/CE. It stipulates that “a Performance Regime should be implemented throughout the 
                                                 
12
 Source: various annual reports from CFF. 
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network within each Member State”.  Whereas the EU directive applies to the traffic within a 
network, it was considered opportune to develop a performance regime for international trains 
between networks so that the international trains wouldn’t be subject to several national 
performance regimes. 
In fact, Article 11 of Directive 2001/14/EC states that “Infrastructure charging schemes shall 
through a performance scheme encourage railway undertakings and the infrastructure manager to 
minimize disruption and improve the performance of the railway network.” The Performance 
scheme is therefore a definite part of the infrastructure charging scheme. 
A broader initiative is taking place at the European level to deal with performance regimes. 
Launched by the UIC Infrastructure Forum, the European Performance Regime (EPR) aims at 
putting in place a system which monitors the performance of the European railway service and 
which provides penalization to bad performances13. One of the strategic issues of the EPR is to 
build a common system for all European railways that avoids the fragmentation of different 
domestic system with more costs for the infrastructure managers (IMs) and the railway 
undertakings (RUs)14. Performance indicators include the number of train paths, speed of train 
paths and punctuality of freight services15. 
Performance in selected countries 
In the Netherlands a number of performance schemes have been devised, including the 
availability of the infrastructure, disruptions to train traffic, timely order acceptance, quality of 
railway yards, ordering /cancellations, delay experienced/caused by railway undertakings and 
quiet wagon kilometers (ProRail, 2010).  Italy has devised a performance quality incentive plan 
                                                 
13
 In 2008 an EPR MoU on the EPR development was signed by many UIC and RNE Members and in March 2009 
UIC called for volunteering Companies along the Europtirails corridors to start the preparations for the EPR Pilot 
Application. 
14
 The common features of the proposed models: corridor-based approach , applied on the whole train path, 
monitoring made per train, based on delays, including secondary delays, providing an incentive to recover delays, 
foresees financial penalties, limits  penalties to a warning function. In the Rotterdam-Genoa corridor the monitoring 
of traffic and performance is already conducted by IMs. 
15
 Ministries of Transport are nonetheless asked to cooperate on the development of EPR including corridor aspects 
on the basis of punctuality measurements and broader shared analysis of causes of delay. 
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(called Performance Regime) based on delays recorded at the end of the journey by the trains 
running on the national rail network (RFI, 2009)16. 
By far the most advanced and transparent infrastructure performance system is the one in the UK 
– something that reflects the “advanced” state of liberalization of the British railway sector. The 
regulator publishes on a yearly basis a report on the performance of the infrastructure manager 
(Network Rail). These indicators are then grouped into a general performance indicator including 
safety, performance (train delays, public performance measures), asset stewardship and value 
(cost efficiency measure)17. 
Finally, a number of infrastructure performance regimes have been devised in the framework of 
the public-private partnerships (PPP) for high-speed lines in Europe (e.g. HSL Zuid). 
Table 3 Network rail performance criteria 
Indicator Criteria 
Network availability – Possession disruption index 
– Freight disruption index 
Train performance – Public performance measure (total, long-distance, regional) 
– Cancellations and significant lateness (total, long-distance, 
regional) 
– Delay minutes (passenger, freight) 
Infrastructure – Number of asset failures 
Customer satisfaction  
Finance – Network Rail (IM) efficiency index 
– Expenditure (operations, maintenance, renewals, enhancements) 
Source: Office of Railway Regulation (ORR) 
3.2 Electricity 
Liberalization in the electricity sector 
                                                 
16
 The IM or RU are accountable for the delays recorded by any train, even trains belonging to a different RU, for 
reasons within their control, and penalties shall be applied calculated in accordance with Schedule E to this section. 
As regards the calculation of the penalties, they consist of € 2.00 per minute of delay and are to be adjusted on an 
annual basis according to the same procedures utilized for updating the access charge. The penalty payable for each 
delayed train by the IM or, through the IM, by another RU, shall not exceed 20% of the access charge due for the 
train itself, not including the traction electricity charge. At the end of each financial year, the IM calculates the 
penalties due/payable to the RU itself or the IM and enters it for no more than 1.5% of the value of the overall 
charge recorded to each RU. 
17
 These indicators are also used for the remuneration of Executive Directors. 
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Before liberalization, the electricity sector was typically managed by vertically integrated 
utilities (VIU). VIUs operated electricity generation, transmission and distribution as a 
geographically confined monopoly (e.g. for a city, a region or a country). As a prerequisite for 
liberalization and electricity markets, VIUs had to be unbundled: While the generation and 
distribution part were opened to competition, the transmission part was seen as a natural 
monopoly and hence had to be regulated. Independent Transmission System Operators (TSOs) 
were created to operate the transmission system in a non-discriminatory way. TSOs typically 
own and operate the transmission system above a certain voltage level (e.g. 220 kV).  
Thus, there are the following elements in the liberalized electricity sector:  
- Generation: Generators, both central and decentral units as well as renewable and non-
renewable, that produce electricity. 
- Transmission: The Transmission System Operator (TSO) runs the transmission system, 
including the connection of generators, large consumers and underlying distribution networks 
to the transmission network. 
- Distribution: Distribution System Operators (DSOs) run the distribution system at lower 
voltage levels that delivers electricity to the end consumers. 
- Suppliers: Different from generators and DSOs, supplying companies may contract with 
consumers to deliver electricity, regardless of their point of connection. 
In the following, we look at the TSO as the infrastructure manager, his critical functions and his 
performance.  
Critical technical functions and the role of the infrastructure manager 
First, there is interconnection. The interconnected system encompasses all parts of the system 
that are physically connected through transmission lines, cables or transformers. There is a 
horizontal interconnection that links geographic areas (neighborhoods, cities, countries, 
continents) and a vertical interconnection that links different voltage levels (through voltage 
transformation), from the highest-voltage transmission network (220 kV and above) to the low-
voltage residential distribution network (e.g. 230 V). The degree of interconnection is 
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determined by the amount of interconnection capacity between parts of the network. In the case 
of the European electricity system, the interconnected system ranges from the Nordic countries 
to Africa and from the Iberian Peninsula to Russia, Turkey and beyond.  
The infrastructure manager(s) are responsible for maintenance and extension of (investment in) 
the interconnected network. 
Second, there is interoperation. Interoperation between parts of an electricity system means that 
electricity can be exchanged between these parts of the system. Interoperation requires either a 
connection by a direct-current (DC) transmission line or cable (examples being UK-France, 
Norway-Netherlands, Italy-Greece) or a synchronized alternating-current (AC) connection, i.e. 
the network parts have to use a common frequency (such as 50 Hz) that has to be synchronized 
(that is, it has the same timing of the frequency oscillation). In the case of the European 
electricity system, the interoperated system ranges from the Nordic countries and UK till 
Northern Africa and from the Iberian Peninsula till Eastern Europe (Poland, Western Ukraine, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey since September 2010.  
The infrastructure manager(s) are responsible for a continuous interoperability by ensuring a 
proper AC synchronization or AC-DC conversion. 
Third, there is system management: The critical technical function of system management 
further limits the scope of the electricity system, both horizontally and vertically: Horizontally, 
the need to maintain a synchronized frequency in an AC network yields a strong interdependence 
of all parts of this network, leading to  tight system management. Network parts linked by a DC 
line or cable can and usually do also share system management functions, though to a lesser 
degree, leading to a loose system management. In the European case, (interdependent) system 
management regions are formed by the Nordic countries, the UK, and continental Europe 
(including parts of Northern Africa and Turkey). In vertical terms, the system management in an 
electricity system is divided by the voltage levels. The system management on the highest 
voltage levels (the transmission network, starting from 220kV, sometimes less) is typically done 
by an entity called transmission system operator (TSO), while the system management on lower 
voltage levels (distribution network) is done by more local distribution system operators (DSOs). 
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In the European case and any other case of large geographic extension, the transmission network 
is the most relevant with regards to system management.  
The infrastructure manager(s) are responsible for system management by maintaining frequency 
and voltage parameters within a certain range and by running a proper congestion management.  
Performance criteria from an infrastructure manager perspective 
There are several performance criteria that apply to the electricity sector and its infrastructure 
manager(s). For instance, the British electricity system operator, National Grid UK, defines its 
performance indicators based on the following criteria (Nationalgrid, 2010): Health and safety 
(injuries to employees and to the public as a direct result of TSO operation), shareholder value, 
reliability (electricity delivered as a proportion of electricity demanded), customer satisfaction, 
environment (greenhouse gas emissions, energy use, waste), employees (headcount, share of 
females and ethnic minorities, breaches of code of conduct), and society (community 
investments). Clearly, there are performance indicators relating both to the infrastructure 
management and to the infrastructure manager itself. 
Based on the five performance categories introduced above, one can define performance in the 
following, generic way: Technical performance as the age and reliability of transmission assets 
(lines, transformers etc.), operational performance as system availability, system control quality 
(frequency, voltage), switching times and (n-1) system security, social performance as the degree 
of uninterrupted availability for end consumers, economic performance as congestion cost, 
redispatch cost, ancillary services cost, system operation cost, network cost (assets and 
maintenance), system losses and network investments, and environmental performance as the 
degree of integration of renewable energies and greenhouse gas emissions.  
The extent to which these performance criteria are internal or external (i.e. externally 
communicated by the infrastructure manager, e.g. to a regulator), mainly depends on national 
legislation and regulation. Countries that apply an incentive regulation typically have a high 
degree of external performance indicators. Different from other sectors (such as air traffic), there 
is not yet a common set of performance indicators on the European level. 
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While performance indicators are similar for different TSOs, they do depend on the geographical 
scope taken into account. Some performance criteria apply at a regional or European level and 
there are inter-dependencies between the performance at the European level and the performance 
at the local/national levels. For instance, a reduction in congestion cost at the European level 
may require network investments at the national level, and therefore higher network costs 
(economic performance) at the national level.  
3.3 Air transport 
The air transport sector is a typical network industry in that it is characterized both by technology 
and institutions. Furthermore, both technology and institutions co-evolve so as to make the air 
transport sector particularly dynamic. The particular characteristic of the air transport sector as 
compared to the other network industries lies in the fact that it has never been vertically 
integrated. The sector is thus composed of three separate elements: 
- Airlines: historically, airlines were national flag carriers, generally owned by the state 
(national government). In principle, every country had one national publicly owned flag 
carrier, which had a monopoly. The major exception here is the United States which 
never had a flag carrier. Since the 1980s (globalization), many of these flag carriers were 
privatized but nevertheless often enjoyed a privileged treatment vis-à-vis foreign 
competitors or new entrants. 
- Air traffic control: air traffic control is of military origin as it its original purpose is to 
control and, with the help of the army, defend national air space. Over time, civil aviation 
activities became more important than military activities, leading to separate civil and 
military air traffic control, generally working in parallel. Still today, a substantial portion 
of national airspace is reserved for military purposes (up to 40% of the airspace). Over 
time Air traffic control has been autonomized from the public administration and 
transformed in public autonomous entities, however without being privatized. With the 
exception of Europe, air traffic control is still a national public and monopolistic 
endeavor. 
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- Airports: airports are local public monopolies, generally not competing against one 
another. They are owned by the local authorities and rarely by the national authorities. In 
some cases, one or several airports can be of national importance and as such owned by 
the national governments so as to support their national flag carriers. Two significant 
changes have occurred in matters of airports since the 1980s, namely (1) the fact that they 
are increasingly managed by way of public private partnerships (generally, the local 
authority remains the owner) and (2) the fact that smaller airports (often military airports) 
have been transformed to receive passenger traffic, parallel to the emergence of low cost 
airlines (see below 2). 
All three elements, together, constitute the air transport system. From the above, we can see that 
there has been some organizational change (albeit quite limited) in the three elements 
(privatization, PPP, autonomization), but there has not been much technological change (bigger 
airplanes, better air traffic control). The challenge of the air transport sector is thus not so much 
in the different elements, than rather in its systemic nature of the sector, i.e., how can these three 
elements best be coordinated so as to perform optimally. 
Liberalization of air transport 
Air transport is generally considered to be a model of liberalization: it is said that markets have 
emerged and that they work because of the deregulation of the air transport sector. This is 
however not really true. To recall, liberalization in the air transport sector takes the form of so-
called “freedoms”, with the 9th freedom being the ultimate one. “”Freedoms” are the result not so 
much of markets but of negotiations between nation-states. As a matter of fact, even for airlines 
(let alone airports and air traffic control), liberalization is a very limited endeavor which can take 
three different forms: 
- Countries negotiate among themselves to increase the amount of flights between 
themselves and to grant the rights to overfly their territory; they can also increase the 
respective freedoms (e.g., landing and taking passers in one country). Open sky 
agreements between countries are a further step in the liberalization in that not only pairs 
of flights are agreed to but baskets of flights. 
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- Countries, especially big countries, liberalize their air transport, something which first 
happened in the United States in the 1980s. This means that restrictions on the amount of 
flights, the fares, the conditions are eased so as to allow for more flights. Similar 
liberalizations have happened in China and in India. 
- The third form is so far unique in that it concerns only the European Union with the idea 
to create a single European air transport market. This endeavor is similar to the previous 
one in what concerns the market for airlines but of course implies many countries and 
does not just happen within a country. 
As a result of the above three forms of “liberalization”, traffic volumes have increased 
exponentially since the 1980s especially, parallel to globalization: there are more airlines, more 
flights, and on certain routes more competition, leading to lower prices. This affects in particular 
Air traffic control and airports (i.e., infrastructure managers). A particular step in the increase of 
competition was made by the market entry of so-called low-cost airlines, and one can say that it 
is basically the low-cost airlines, and not so much the competition among the traditional network 
airlines, which has led to cheaper prices. Such market entry was made possible because of 
deregulation in the United States and the creation of a single air transport market in Europe. On 
the other hand, the network airlines have consolidated in so-called alliances – there are now only 
three global alliances, which has led to reduced competition among network airlines – and some 
of them have gone out of business, leading to concentration. 
In short growing volumes will put pressure on the use of airspace and airport slots, both of which 
are limited. Pressure thus grows to improve Air traffic control and airport performance, in 
particular when it comes to capacity (airspace) and slot allocation (airports). 
Performance in air transport 
In terms of performance, one must mention the fact that there are no performance indicators for 
the air transport sector as a whole. Rather, performance is measured separately for airlines, 
airports and air traffic control. The only overall consideration and sometimes performance 
indicator pertains to safety, namely accident, serious incidents, and incidents). 
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As for air traffic control (ATC) or air traffic management (ATM), performance indicators pertain 
mainly to safety (incidents mainly), to ATC costs, as well as to CO2 emissions. The following 
tables summarize the key performance indicators from the air traffic control and the airports 
perspectives. 
Table 4: Performance indicators from the air transport perspective 
Performance Indicators Definition 
Safety  The conformance of air transport to specified safety targets. 
Delay  The time in excess of the optimum time that it takes a user to 
complete an operation. 
Cost Effectiveness  
 
The value for money that users receive from the supply of air 
traffic services. 
Predictability  The ability of a user to predict variation and to build and 
maintain optimum flight schedules. 
Access  The accessibility of airspace, ATC services and airport facilities 
under controllable conditions. 
Flexibility  The ability of ATC to accommodate changing user needs in real 
time and without penalty. 
Flight Efficiency  The ability of the ATC system to allow a user to adopt the 
preferred flight profile in terms of flight level and route. 
Availability  The availability of critical ATC resources and of the ATC 
services provided to users. 
Environment  The conformance of air transport to environmental regulations. 
Equity  Equity of treatment of flights by all aircraft operators within and 
between specific classes of users. 
Source: Authors 
Table 5: Performance indicators from the airports' perspective 
Operations Traffic Activity Total passengers 
Total cargo 
Total operations 
Physical Facilities Land area, runways, taxiways, apron 
Terminals, concourses, gates 
Ticket counter, security, baggage 
Parking spaces 
Airfield Aircraft, Terminal 
Passenger, and Landside 
Transportation 
Runway, taxiway, airfield design, layout and 
aircraft processing efficiency 
Airfield terminal area, aircraft processing 
efficiency 
Terminal passenger flow and processing 
efficiency 
Terminal curb and landside processing 
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efficiency 
Airline Fees & 
Charges 
Aeronautical Charges-
Airfield 
Landing & take-off fees 
Aircraft apron, parking and gate fees 
Aircraft environmental fees 
Aircraft fuelling fees and other ground 
handling fees 
Aeronautical Related 
Charges-Terminal 
Ticket counter space 
Boarding gates and loading bridges 
Administrative office space 
Flight kitchens and services 
Baggage processing/handling 
Passenger lounges 
FIS, BIDS and CUTE fees 
Additional 
Passenger 
Services and 
Revenue 
Sources 
Non-Aeronautical 
Concession Revenues-
Terminal 
Retail/specialty retail 
Food/beverage 
News/gifts 
Duty free/tax free 
Advertising 
Hotels 
Non-Aeronautical 
Concession Revenues-
Landside 
Parking 
Rental cars 
Taxis, buses, limos 
Rail and train stations 
Other commercial vehicles 
Hotels, conference centers, office buildings 
Shopping centers 
Financial Operating and 
Maintenance Costs 
Personnel costs 
Soft costs/outsourcing 
Supplies and materials 
Repairs and maintenance 
Communications and utilities costs 
Law enforcement and firefighting costs 
Other operating costs 
Other Financial Other non-operating revenues 
Cash flow and liquidity 
Debt (bonds and loans) 
Return on equity and assets 
EBITA and net profit 
Capital expenditures and costs 
Passenger 
Service 
Quality of Community 
Airline Service 
Number of Airlines 
Airline routes and frequencies 
Aircraft types and fleet mix 
Airline competition and airfares 
Quality of Airport 
Facilities and Services 
Quality of experience coming to airport 
Quality of passenger processing (check-in, 
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(customer satisfaction) gate, customs and immigration and security) 
Quality of airport commercial services 
Quality of airport physical facilities 
Airport Council International-Airport Benchmarking to Maximize Efficiency 
 Environmental Impact  Air pollution 
Global emissions 
Aircraft Noise 
Incidents/accidents 
Congestions and delays 
Infrastructure Construction (erosion, impact on 
ecosystem) 
Water/soil pollution 
Waste management 
Source: (Janic, 1999): Sources: Crayston (1992); Morrissette (1996) 
Safety is the major indicator. Table 6 develops in further detail how the indicator is calculated. It 
contains not only safety as related to ATC, but also airports and airlines. 
Table 6: Details of the safety indicator 
 Accidents Serious incidents Other incidents 
ATC Ratio Number of accidents 
where ATC 
contributed, as direct 
or indirect causes 
Number of serious 
incidents where ATC 
contributed, as direct 
or indirect causes 
Number of other 
incidents where ATC 
contributed, as direct 
or indirect causes 
Air-Air Number of midair 
collisions 
Number of critical 
near midair collisions 
Number of other air-
air incidents (e.g. loss 
of separations, 
deviations from 
clearance, airspace 
infringements) 
Air-Ground Number of collisions 
with the ground 
Number of critical 
near collisions with 
the ground 
Number of other air-
ground incidents (e.g. 
CFIT incident, 
deviations from 
clearance) 
Ground-Ground Number of collisions 
on the ground 
Number of critical 
near collisions on the 
ground 
Number of other 
ground-ground 
incidents (e.g. 
RWY/TWY/AP 
RON incursions) 
Others Number of other 
types of accidents 
Number of other 
types of serious 
incidents 
Number of other 
types of other 
incidents 
TOTAL Total number of Total number of Total number of other 
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accidents serious incidents incidents 
Source: Authors 
Critical technical functions 
In terms of the critical technical functions, mainly interoperability and capacity management are 
an issue: 
- Interoperability has mainly been an issue in the past and is mostly relevant for safety: the 
main issue here is the human and technical communication between the airline (airplanes) 
on the one hand and air traffic control (and airports) on the other. All commercial airlines 
are now interoperable (something furthered by the suppliers), but there remain problems 
of interoperability with general aviation and the military. 
- Capacity management: with the increase of traffic, capacity management is becoming a 
growing issue, especially in North America, Europe and Asia now. Air traffic control is 
being constantly improved, in particular thanks to technological progress (satellite 
navigation, TCAS), but capacity problems remain and are actually becoming more 
severe. 
4. Analysis 
The case studies have been done from an infrastructure manager perspective, as is the analysis. 
First, each case is analyzed in itself, before a cross-sectorial analysis. 
4.1 Sectorial analysis 
Railways 
Given the interdependencies between upstream and downstream providers in network industries, 
performance of railway infrastructure managers must be seen both from a firm-level and 
network-level perspective. In other words, some performances depend heavily on the interaction 
between train operators and track managers (e.g., noise generated by wheel-to-rail contact) while 
others are solely the resort of the infrastructure manager (e.g. asset failures). What complicates 
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the matter is the economic characteristic of the infrastructure manager and its dependence on the 
government to fund its activities. 
A number of comments can be made specifically to the performance measurement of the railway 
infrastructure manager in Switzerland. Overall performance and performance indicators remain 
rather general both at the government level and at the firm level. The strategic objectives of the 
Federal Council remain rather vague which plays both for and against the infrastructure manager. 
On one hand, it does not put excessive pressure to become more efficient. For instance, nothing 
seems to be planned in case the objectives are not met. On the other hand, the lack of precise 
performance objectives prevents the infrastructure manager from asking for the necessary 
resources to reach these objectives. Although performance and its indicators have been in use at 
the firm/division level for some time, publication of performance indicators in a transparent and 
regular manner remains, punctuality and safety aside, limited. To be fair the integrated nature of 
SBB and the lack of competition on the rails makes performance measurement less a requirement 
than in fully open access networks (e.g., in the UK). The absence of public-private partnerships 
in Switzerland also reduces the need to have a very precise understanding of performance. On 
the other hand, further liberalization of the passenger sector may require SBB or the regulator to 
define a transparent performance regime in which responsibilities are clearly defined and where 
the various actors are incentivized to perform. 
Electricity 
A key finding of the electricity sector case study is that in a highly interconnected and 
interoperable network (such as the European one), national and regional/European performance 
indicators are highly inter-dependent and potentially contradictory, in the sense that a 
performance increase on one level can entail a performance decrease on another level. Hence 
both the system boundaries and the organizational and institutional boundaries have to be taken 
into account when defining performance criteria.  
In the European practice, performance criteria are defined both by national regulators and by 
European bodies, such as the European Commission or the newly created Association for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). At the national level, the degree to which 
performance indicators are applied depends on the regulatory regime, which may vary from 
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country to country: For instance, the UK and Nordic countries (as early movers in electricity 
liberalization) apply performance criteria far more extensively and transparently than other 
countries do. At the European level, harmonized performance indicators that apply for all of 
Europe have not yet been defined, the only exception relating to anti-trust indicators from DG 
Competition assessing the level of competition in national electricity markets.  
Air transport 
The infrastructure manager in the case of the air transport industry are the Air Traffic Control, 
and partly airports as well. The main problem here is capacity (airspace and airport slots), which 
obviously requires a supranational effort in terms of management but at the least in terms of 
regulation. However, no matter what is done in terms of capacity and corresponding 
performance, it will always also relate to safety and safety indicators. 
Summary 
The following table summarizes the performance indicators (at a strategic level) for all three 
sectors. The internal indicators were obtained through interviews and are the infrastructure 
manager’s own measurement of their performance. The external indicators are the one published 
publicly. Both are considered in order to include all existing indicators. 
 
Table 7: Performance indicators from the infrastructure manager perspective 
Network 
Industry 
Performance 
Internal External 
Electricity
18
 
Technical: Age and reliability of transmission assets (lines, transformers 
etc.) 
Operational: System availability, system control quality (frequency, 
voltage), switching times, (n-1) system security 
Social: Degree of uninterrupted availability for end consumers, electricity 
price. 
Economic: Costs of congestion, redispatch, ancillary services, system 
operation, network (assets and maintenance), system losses and network 
investments, 
Environmental: Degree of integration of renewable energies and 
                                                 
18
 Nationalgrid (2010) and other TSO reports. 
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greenhouse gas emissions. 
Railways Technical: network availability 
Operational: punctuality, quality 
Social: quality 
Economic: productivity 
Environmental : noise and CO2 
reduction 
Technical: interoperability 
Operational: punctuality, network 
management, capacity allocation 
Social: affordability 
Economic: productivity 
Environmental: noise (reduction),  
Air 
transport 
Technical: flight efficiency 
Operational: Safety, delays 
Social: accessibility and affordability 
Economic: ATC fees, airport fees, cost effectiveness  
Environmental : CO2 emissions, noise 
Sources: Authors 
4.2 Cross-sectorial performance indicators 
Performance indicators are sector-specific. Nevertheless, common indicators can be found across 
network industries. Based on Table 7, the following outcomes can be derived. Firstly, the 
economic indicators are well defined and mainly concern costs and productivity. With the 
liberalization and privatization, the importance of the economic dimension of performance in the 
sectors is increasing. This is not surprising since state-owned firms tend to be increasingly 
treated as private firms. Secondly, the weight of the safety/security indicator as part of the 
operational category is gaining in importance as well. This indicator is linked with the delivery 
on time of electricity and the safety and punctuality in railways and air transport. In addition, 
acceptance of risk is falling. On the other hand, the importance of the technical indicators is 
decreasing. These indicators are well defined as well due to their historical importance, but are 
mainly reduced to the measurement of breakdowns today. The social indicators are not well 
defined anymore which shows their decreasing weight in defining performance. The question 
really is whether this is the problem of the infrastructure manager or the operator. The social 
indicators are mainly linked to affordability and accessibility, but with the stronger focus on 
economics, the quality notion is becoming less important. Finally, the environmental indicators 
are coming up and are currently almost solely linked to GHG emissions19. 
                                                 
19
 More renewable energy within the electricity network is also a way to reduce GHG emissions. 
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4.3 Performance indicators allocated to the critical technical functions 
In order to be more precise in evaluating the impact of the performance definition on the network 
industry, the performance indicators are allocated to the three critical technical functions 
described in Section 1 (see Table 8). As the degree of coherence is evaluated for each critical 
technical function, the indicators can contribute to make the evaluation more concrete and less 
conceptual. Therefore it could lead in a further research to better define coherence and its link to 
performance, as well as align institutions and technologies. 
Table 8: Performance indicators allocated to the critical technical functions 
Performance categories Critical technical functions 
Interconnection Interoperability System 
Management 
Technical    
Breakdowns (availability) X X X 
Operational    
Security/Safety  X  X  
Punctuality   X  
System control   X  
Social    
Affordability X  X  X  
Accessibility X  X   
Economic    
Costs X  X  X20 
Productivity X  X  X  
Environmental    
GHG emissions X X X 
Source: Authors 
Most indicators concern all three technical critical functions. Only the operational indicators 
relate mainly to the system management. Therefore, each performance category influences the 
degree of coherence in a broad sense and thus the alignment of institutions and technologies. 
                                                 
20
 Certain costs concern only one or two critical technical functions, such as congestion costs which relate only to 
the system management or ancillary service cost which relate to the system management and interoperability.  
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4.4 Improvement to the existing coherence framework 
The main result is a better understanding of performance. The different actors (infrastructure 
manager, operators, regulators, customers, government) all define performance differently. 
Based on the five performance categories, each actor will weigh each indicator differently. 
Therefore, the alignment between institutions and technologies should vary with each actor’s 
perspective, and thus the coherence represented in Figure 1 will follow each time a different 
curve. 
Ultimately, the key question is who is setting the performance definition within the sector. For 
network industries, the consumers still perceive it as an essential service which is provided, 
which is less true for air transport. Thus, they will influence through their voting power 
(especially in Switzerland with the direct democracy) the government and its public policy 
objectives. Therefore, the key actor defining the performance in a network industry is the 
government. A further paper could elaborate on this point. 
Even if there are performance indicators communicated to the public, it does not mean that they 
are the actual indicators used internally. As in certain cases, when the government does not give 
a clear definition of the required performance of the infrastructure, the infrastructure manager 
has the freedom to define himself internally his performance and the appropriate indicators. He 
will therefore measure internally.  
Certain indicators important to the public such as affordability and accessibility are not part of 
the main measured indicators within the sector. This shows that the customers can’t (anymore) 
influence as much as maybe wished certain aspects of performance of the network industries. 
It had been suggested in Section 1.1 to introduce indicators for the four different perspectives 
(scope of control, coordination mechanisms, resolution and speed of adjustment) of the 
evaluation of the degree of coherence. As these four perspectives are applied to each critical 
technical function, and as the performance indicators have now be allocated to these functions, a 
link could be established between performance, through its indicators, and coherence, through its 
indicators related the four perspectives. This offers an approach to make the causality between 
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coherence and performance measurable and more quantitative. Further research could develop on 
this. 
5. Conclusion 
The coherence framework aims to evaluate the degree of coherence between the institutions and 
the technology in the case of network industries. This evaluation should lead to assess the 
performance of the sector. Unfortunately, the causality between coherence and performance, as 
well as between coherence and the alignment between institutions and technologies remain fuzzy 
and very conceptual. This paper changed the approach to look first at the performance and then 
at the coherence.  
In any case, both performance and coherence have to be better defined. This paper tackles the 
performance definition which constitutes the first weakness of the coherence framework. The 
methodology has been to review the coherence framework and performance literature, followed 
by cases studies of three sectors from the perspective of the infrastructure manager.  
The analysis shows that performance is still loosely defined. However, there are common 
performance indicators across the three studied sectors (railways, electricity, air transport). The 
importance of the economic indicators, as well as security/safety as indicator, is steadily 
increasing as a consequence of the institutional changes such as liberalization and privatization. 
The environmental indicators gain in importance as well, whereas the social and technical 
indicators decrease in weight. As the economic indicators become the major performance 
measurement, the question in the end is how much the customers are ready to pay for which type 
of performance. 
Most of the performance indicators concern the three critical technical functions. Thus the degree 
of coherence of each function is determined by all performance categories. No conclusion on the 
causality between performance and coherence can be derived yet. However, the clearer 
performance is defined, the easier it will become to study the causality based on the critical 
technical functions. Further research is therefore needed not only on the causality, but on the 
definition of coherence itself.  
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The problem of how the alignment between institutions and technology has to be established 
depends on which performance is targeted at. In other words, the questions are how to develop 
the right institutions given the state of the technology, or how to innovate and develop the 
technology within given institutions in order to get a certain performance. To be able to monitor 
the alignment, indicators should not change with every annual report. Continuity in measuring 
performance according to well established indicators must be given. 
As developed in the analysis, it is ultimately the government who defines the targeted 
performance for the infrastructure manager within a sector as he operates in regulated monopoly 
situation. Performance indicators can consequently lead to decide on subsidies, fines and even 
bonus/malus for the managers.  
Performance indicators to define performance, and thus further develop the coherence 
framework quantitatively, are nice to have, but if they are not linked to some decisions making, 
they are useless. It will therefore become more and more important that the governments and 
regulators use such indicators to monitor the actors in the network industries who provide 
essential services for the public welfare of its citizens.  
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